Policy analysis techniques have usually been developed independently of applications or they have been tailored to policies with specific purposes, e.g. they have been used to analyze access control policies, system management policies or privacy policies. There are analysis techniques to detect redundancy and incompleteness of policies. There are also techniques to detect modality conflicts such as obligations that cannot be fulfilled because of the lack of authorizations, and techniques to detect circular dependencies of obligations. The intent of this paper is to present a survey of these and other analysis techniques that have been developed independently for the analysis of security and privacy policies, and to show how these techniques can be harmonized to analyze the interactions between these two types of policies. Working with health care examples we will show how these different techniques can be applied to improve the quality of policies.
Introduction
The authoring and implementation of security and privacy policies is usually a distributed process. In a medium size organization there might be global privacy and security policies that apply across the organization while individual departments may have their own policies. Each department implementing their policies might also be responsible for the local implementation of the organization-wide policies. Departments interact and provide services to each other or combine services to serve other departments or entities external to the organization. All these interactions between different parts of an organization create an incredible challenge for the management of security and privacy policies. Maintaining consistency across different parts of the organization which can all be creating and modifying policies necessitates the development of tools and methodologies to manage the policies life cycle. In a companion paper [18] we describe a general framework for security and policy management. In this paper we will look in detail at a fundamental component of the framework: policy analysis.
Policy analysis techniques have usually been developed independently of applications or they have been tailored to policies with specific purposes, e.g. they have been used to analyze access control policies, system management policies or privacy policies. There are analysis techniques to detect redundancy and incompleteness of policies. There are also techniques to detect modality conflicts such as obligations that cannot be fulfilled because of the lack of authorizations, and techniques to detect circular dependencies of obligations. The intent of this paper is to present a survey of these and other analysis techniques that have been developed independently for the analysis of security and privacy policies and show how these techniques can be harmonized to analyze the interactions between these two types of policies. Working with health care examples we will show how these different techniques can be applied to improve the quality of policies.
The meaning of security or privacy policies can significantly differ from situation to situation, and the languages in which these policies are expressed can also vary significantly. Our interest in this paper is to look at security and privacy policies as they are applied and implemented in IT systems. In particular, we will focus on access control policies and obligations. An access control policy determines who is authorized to have access to what data or resources and under what circumstances. These are examples of access control policies:
-Security: Radiologists can access image processing applications and tools.
-Privacy: Radiologists can collect patient medical information for the purpose of treatment.
There are many classes of obligations, but in this paper we will consider obligations that are needed to get or maintain access to data or resources. In many situations obligations can be interpreted as conditions that must be satisfied to enable the access. But in contrast to a regular condition that merely checks the state of the environment where the policy is evaluated (e.g., the time of the day), the obligation involves an action that changes the environment. Thus, we will consider an obligation to be an action or process that must be performed at certain times under certain conditions in order to gain or maintain access to data or resources. These are examples of access control policies with obligations:
-Security: Hospital staff must change passwords every 90 days to maintain access to the computer system.
-Privacy: Doctors can collect medical information of a minor for the purpose of treatment after obtaining a written authorization from his/her legal guardian.
In the security example to get access to computer systems the obligation is to change the password every 90 days.
In the privacy example, to collect medical information the obligation is to obtain the guardian authorization.
Before we start our discussion on analysis we will introduce in Section 2 an elementary notion of access control policy and build on this notion to describe the different analysis techniques. We will discuss in Section 3 basic analysis techniques for access control policies. We will talk about how to discover ineffective policies, potential inconsistencies and redundancies. We then move to obligations in Section 4. The first part of this section extends the notion of access control from Section 2 to incorporate obligations. In the second part we discuss analysis techniques for obligations. In Section 5 we take a different look at policy analysis. In this section we explore two methodologies for finding similarities among policies. The first method takes a broad view of policies and tries to cluster policies based on structural similarities. The second method takes a narrow view and can point out similarities and differences based on the specific input/output behavior of the policies. In Section 6 we look at the problem of policy distribution. This section discusses a general architecture in which an access control request is decided by more than a single party. It describes analysis methodologies to decompose policies for distributed evaluation. In the last section, Section 7, we have some concluding remarks including some references to policy analyses not covered in this paper.
Access control policies
We first start by assuming that there is a generic computer system that possesses data or resources that need to be protected from unauthorized accesses. Policies are defined to apply to this system. Definition 1 An access control policy (rule) is a tuple of the form (Subjects, Action, Resources, P urpose, Condition)
The subjects terms identifies a subset of all the entities (e.g. an individual or process) that can potentially invoke an action in the system. The action is any operation (e.g. deleting a file) that can be applied to a resource in the system. The resources term identifies a subset of all entities for which access can be restricted (e.g. data, or computer resources like Web-servers or database servers). The purpose is an optional argument selected from a pre-defined set of purposes that subjects may have for executing an action. If the purpose is not used in the rule it will be replaced by null. The condition is a boolean expression (i.e. a predicate) that might involve the attributes of the other four arguments plus system attributes. We call the set of available attributes the context of evaluation.
Subjects, action, and resources are classical components of access control policies that specify who can access what and invoke which operation. Conditions are introduced to realize more fine-grained polices. The condition checks for properties of the context with no intended side effects. For example, it can further constrain the scope of the target of an access control policy. If a side effect is required we will consider that an obligation and special considerations must be made. We will discuss obligations in detail in Section 4. The purpose for which an access request is undertaken is indispensable to privacy policies.
We can provide two different readings to a rule (S, A, R, P, C):
-Any member of the set of Subjects S is authorized to execute action A on any member of the set of resources R for the purpose P if the condition C holds.
-No member of the set of Subjects S is authorized to execute action A on any member of the set of resources R for the purpose P if the condition C holds.
The first reading identifies the rule as a positive authorization while the second identifies it as a negative authorization. To disambiguate the reading we will write +(S, A, R, P, C) for positive authorizations and −(S, A, R, P, C) for a negative authorization when needed.
The two examples in the introduction are both positive authorizations. The security policy example includes two rules. In the first rule S = the radiologists, A = access, R = the image applications, there is no purpose and the condition is the boolean constant true. The second rule only changes in the set of resources involved, R = image tools. The privacy example has S = the radiologists, A = collect, R = patient medical information, P = treatment and the condition is the boolean constant true.
Typical environmental attributes that will be used in the condition are time and, in mobile systems, location. Other attributes could refer to properties of the subjects and the resources. For example, if the resource is patient data an attribute could be the owner of the data and properties of the owner such as date of birth and marital status.
There are many access control systems that only handle positive authorizations. In these systems a negative closed world is assumed and every action that is not explicitly authorized is denied. Although it is not common practice, a system can assume a positive closed world and allow only negative authorizations and every action that is not explicitly denied is authorized. Many systems separate the policy evaluation from the final policy decision. In such a case one can mix positive and negative authorizations, so that the evaluation of a set of policy rules on an action can result in permit, deny, both or neither and an independent strategy is used to pick the final result. Writing policies using a pure closed world assumption is complex and not necessarily more secure. The prototypical example of a closed world system is SELinux [25] which uses a negative closed world assumption. In a functional SELinux system the number of policy rules runs over the tens of thousands with no systematic mechanism that can show the soundness (only allowed accesses are permitted) or completeness (all the allowed accesses are permitted) of the policies. The perceived advantage of closed word systems is twofold. One is that in a closed world it would be easier to maintain the principle of least privilege and two, that policy administrators cannot write inconsistent rules, i.e., a set of rules in which an action is allowed by a positive authorization and simultaneously denied by a negative authorization.
Different policy analysis techniques have been developed to ameliorate policy errors (i.e., incompleteness and inconsistency). We will discuss some of them in the following sections.
Basic policy analysis model
We will follow the methodology of the EXAM system [22] to characterize the type of analyses we would like to do to access control policies. In EXAM, analysis queries are classified in three categories: policy metadata queries, policy content queries and policy effect queries.
A policy metadata query would be a query concerning metadata about the policies. Information such as creation and modification dates, authors and location of the policy will be obtained by making metadata queries. Other metadata retrieved using metadata queries are the available subjects, actions and resources in the system, the list of purposes and other system attributes that can be utilized in the condition of a policy rule.
A policy content query directly examines the content of policies. Queries such as how many positive or negative authorizations are in the system, and queries for selecting rules that mention a certain attribute value, or subject or resource can be considered policy content queries. These two categories are the traditional system administration types of queries. Although an access control policy management system must support some subset of these types of queries and they are not necessarily trivial to implement we will not discuss them more in this paper and instead will discuss the policy effect queries in detail. A policy effect query is a query about the outcomes policy rules may produce and the interaction of among policy rules due to their outcomes. In EXAM, policy effect queries are subdivided into two classes: queries about single policy rules and queries about multiple policy rules. Next we will look at these types of queries in detail.
Queries on single policy rules
There is only one type of query that we will describe in this section: property verification queries. An example of a property verification is: given a set of access control requests, is there at least one of these requests for which the policy will make a decision? Other queries may want to know if a policy applies to all the requests or none.
In order to get a better grasp on how difficult answering these queries are we need a more precise specification of access control requests and policy rules. We assume we have a set of objects O partitioned into types. The types will be system dependent but typically there will be simple types like booleans, integers and characters and more complex types like strings, sets and trees. We assume we have available the standard arithmetic and boolean operations that we can apply to the simple objects. An object o of a complex type may have a set of associated attributes {a 1 , . . . , a n } and values of these attributes are also objects of a fixed type. We will use the standard dot notation, o.a i to refer to the value of attribute a i of the object o.
We identify four special sets of objects, the set of subjects S, the set of actions A, the set of resources R and the set of purposes P. All four sets are finite. The intersection of S and R is not necessarily empty, i.e. there might be objects that can be a subject and a resource.
We also assume that the system provides a set F b of boolean functions such that a function f b ∈ F b can take one or more objects as parameters (i.e. f b (o 1 , . . . , o n )), and return either true or f alse. In addition true and f alse are members of F b . They can be interpreted as constant functions (the only functions with zero parameters) with the standard meaning.
A request is a triple (s, a, r, p), where s ∈ S, a ∈ A, r ∈ R and p ∈ P ∪ {null}. In a policy rule (S, A, R, P, C), S ⊆ S, A ∈ A, R ⊆ R, P ∈ P ∪ {null} and C is a boolean expression that combines instances of the system pre-defined boolean functions using the boolean operations and (denoted by ∧), or (denoted ∨) and not (denoted by ¬ or not). In C some of the parameters in the boolean functions can be S, A, R or P .
Given a condition C of a policy rule P r and a request (s, a, r, p), we will denote by C[s, a, r, p] the condition C that results from replacing every occurrence of S, A, R, P by s, a, r, p respectively in C.
The evaluation of a positive authorization rule P r = +(S, A, R, P, C) on a request (s, a, r, p), denoted by eval(P R , (s, a, r, p)), will return permit if s ∈ S, a = A, r ∈ R, P is null or equal to p and the evaluation of the condition C[s, a, r, p] is true; otherwise it will return non applicable.
Similarly, the evaluation of a negative authorization rule P r = −(S, A, R, P, C) on a request (s, a, r, p), denoted by eval(P R , (s, a, r, p)), will return deny if s ∈ S, a = A, r ∈ R, P is null or equal to p and the evaluation of the condition C[s, a, r, p] is true; otherwise it will return non applicable.
A property verification query for a policy rule P r is a tuple of the form (C Pr , O Pr , Q), where C P is a query condition where the subject set S, the action A, the resource set R and the purpose P of P r can occur; O P is one of permit. deny or non applicable and Q is one of none, some or all.
A property verification query (C Pr , O Pr , Q) for a policy rule P r is true if one of the following conditions holds:
1. Q is none and there does not exist a request (s, a, r, p) such that C P [s, a, r, p] is true and eval(P r , (s, a, r, p)) returns O Pr 2. Q is some and there is at least one request (s, a, r, p) such that C P [s, a, r, p] is true and eval(P r , (s, a, r, p)) returns O Pr 3. Q is all and for every request (s, a, r, p) such that C P [s, a, r, p] is true and eval(P r , (s, a, r, p)) returns O Pr
We will refer to these queries as none queries, some queries, and all queries respectively. The most basic property that we can test using a property verification query is whether a policy rule P r applies to any input at all, i.e., does this policy affect any subject? If P r is a positive authorization +(S, A, R, P, C) we query language and the appropriate way to display answers to queries is also an active human computer interaction research area [19, 17, 29] .
can get this answer by asking the query (true, permit, some). If the answer to this query is negative, a negative closed world assumption is used and this is the only rule in the policy every request by any subject against any target will be denied. A similar query can be used for negative authorizations having the opposite effect in a positive closed world, i.e. every access will be permitted. We will call this class of policies ineffective.
It is unlikely that a security or privacy policy is intentionally written to behave this way and the analysis should try to provide an explanation to identify the ineffectiveness. This can happen for three reasons: (i) the set S of subjects is empty; (ii) the set R of resources is empty or (iii) these sets are not empty but there is no request (s, a, r, p) that satisfies the condition C[s, a, r, p]. Hence to answer this type of query we need to detect (i), (ii) and (iii).
We have not specified any properties of the arguments S and R in a policy rule. We only know that they must be finite because they are subsets of S and R. In practice, many times subjects are organized in types or roles and role hierarchies. Similarly resources are organized in types and type hierarchies. Membership verification in these sets can be done in linear time with respect to the size of the set and in most cases can be done in sublinear or constant time. On the other hand, if we allow arbitrary boolean expressions in the condition, even if the evaluation of the system pre-defined boolean functions is fast (i.e. constant time), detecting (iii) is an NP-hard problem since the problem boils down to a satisfiability problem. In practice, however, the number of object attributes involved in a condition and the condition itself are small and testing satisfiability is possible. Next we need to consider the boolean functions in F b . Agrawal et al. [2] identify four categories that frequently occur in policies:
-Category 1: One variable equality constraints.
x = c, where x is a variable and c is a constant.
-Category 2: One variable inequality constraints.
x £ c, where x is a variable, c is a constant, and £ ∈ {<, ≤, >, ≥}.
-Category 3: Regular expression constraints.
, where s is a string variable, and L(r) is the language generated by regular expression r.
-Category 4: Real valued linear constraints. n i=1 a i x i £ c, where x i is variable, a i , c i are constants, and £ ∈ {=, <, ≤, >, ≥}. Agrawal et al. [2] discuss polynomial time algorithms and a system implementation to test for satisfiability of conjunctions of formulas that combine the four categories. The implementation was done to do policy analysis in a policy management system called PMAC [1] . Bandara et al. [5] has an implementation that covers categories 1, 2 and 3 for the Ponder language [10] . Brodie et al. [7] has analysis methods at the structural level, i.e., they parse policies written in structure natural language and verify that all the components of a policy are present and they are written in the appropriate form.
Note that handling the query condition in a property verification query (C Pr , O Pr , Q) is as simple as adding the query condition C Pr to the condition of the policy.
For example, consider a hospital's access control policy P regarding a patient's medical records. Policy P allows access to medical records if the patient has consented and if the subject who needs access is either a nurse or a primary physician. P can be denoted by:
If a patient would like to ensure that under no circumstances is access to his medical records allowed without his consent, he can use the following property verification query Q1 on P :
Q1 :(r =MedicalRecords ∧ Consent = yes, permit, none)
Similarily, if he would like to know if his primary physician has access to his medical records, he can use query Q2 on P :
Q2 :(r =MedicalRecords ∧ Role = PrimaryPhysician, permit, some)
Queries on sets of policy rules
In contrast to having a single rule a policy set can mix positive and negative authorizations. Thus, several rules can apply to a single request returning opposite results, i.e. some permit the request and some deny it. Different implementations handle this in different ways. Some systems assign priorities to the rules like in PMAC [1] , others give priorities to the results [8] , others mix the two [26] and yet others consider it an inconsistency [5] . The queries described in this section are intended to help policy administrators discover the interaction among rules so that they can address them appropriately according to the specific methods available in the system that they use.
Queries over policy sets can be defined either to find commonalities or differences among the sets. We extend the syntax of property verification queries to handle these two cases. Queries will be of the form (C Ps , (O P1 , O P2 ), Q) where both O P1 and O P2 are taken from the set {permit, deny, non applicable}. The answer to this type of query when we are comparing a pair of policy sets (P 1 , P 2 ) is yes or true if one of the following conditions holds:
1. Q is none and there does not exist a request (s, a, r, p) such that C P [s, a, r, p] is true and eval (P 1 , (s, a, r, p) 
2. Q is some and there is at least one request (s, a, r, p) such that C P [s, a, r, p] is true and
3. Q is all and for every request (s, a, r, p) such that C P [s, a, r, p] is true and eval(P 1 , (s, a, r, p)) = O P1 and eval(P 2 , (s, a, r, p)) = O P2 .
Similar to the single rule queries, we will refer to these queries as none queries, some queries, and all queries respectively.
If in the query O P1 = O P2 we call the query common property query. If O P1 = O P2 we call the query discrimination query. If the answer to a discrimination query is yes, this implies there are positive and negative authorization rules that are in conflict, and either a conflict resolution strategy needs to be applied if the sets are mixed.
These queries could be very helpful during the harmonization of security and privacy policies. Assume, for example, that P 1 represents a privacy policy and P 2 represents a security policy and we want to verify that the access that will be permitted by the privacy policy is no larger than the permitted access allowed by the security policy. Then, we just need to ask the query (true, (permit, deny), none). This is assuming that non applicable requests in the security policy are "don't-care" requests; otherwise we also need to check that the query (true, (permit, non applicable), none) is also true. We can also check that a policy is contained in a second policy by checking that both (true, (permit, deny), none) and (true, (deny, permit), none) hold, and to show that the containment is proper at least one of (true, (non applicable, permit), some) and (true, (non applicable, deny), some) must also hold. The policy containment relation is also known as dominance. The policy that contains the second policy is said to dominate the second policy since joining the second policy to the set makes no difference [2] to the access control.
To see how these queries can be implemented we just observe that to check if there is a request (s, a, r, p) for which the two policy rules (S 1 , A 1 , R 1 , P 1 , C 1 ) and (S 2 , A 2 , R 2 , P 2 , C 2 ) apply then it must be the case that
Again assuming that intersection of sets of subjects and sets of resources are easy to compute the hard question is the satisfiability of
The same methods used for property verification queries can be used here. This answers the some query. The none query is answered positively by trying to answer the some query and failing; otherwise it is false. The all query can be answered using a none query by observing that if two policies apply to the same set of requests then if we take the "complement" of one of the policies the resulting pair of policies must have no intersection. Hence, to check that (S 1 , A 1 , R 1 , P 1 , C 1 ) and (S 2 , A 2 , R 2 , P 2 , C 2 ) apply to the same set of requests we need to check that there is no request that applies neither to (
The implementation in [2] covers all these case for PMAC in the four categories with polynomial algorithms when the condition has only ands. Halpern and Weissman [14] use a fragment of multi-sorted first order logic as the language to represent access control policies. They call this fragment Lithium and show that an efficient implementation exists to evaluate policies in this class and treat analysis as logical entailment of formulas. Kolovski et al. [20] formalize XACML policies by using description logic, another subset of first order logic, and then employ logic-based analysis tools for policy analysis. Bandara et al. [5] uses logic programs to represent policies and abduction logic programming techniques to do analysis. The system described in Brodie et al. [7] , also does redundancy analysis of policies that have been specified in structured natural language.
Obligations
As mentioned in the introduction we will look at obligations as they relate to both security and privacy access control policies. Obligations arise in access control when a subject promises to fulfill certain obligations in order to gain access to some target. In the implementation an obligation can always be associated with an action. Take, for example, the obligation from the introduction: Hospital staff must change passwords every 90 days to maintain access to the computer system. Here there is an obligation for any user within a hospital staff role. The user must update his/her password once every 90 days. The obligation should be activated once a user is granted a hospital staff role.
To analyze obligations that apply to access control we need a rational notion to describe them. Before we introduce a more precise definition of obligation we summarize the following features that motivate the definitions below:
• Obligations usually have some specific temporal constraints. Some obligations should be fulfilled before an access is allowed and the result from the obligation fulfillment may affect the decision about the access request. We call these kinds of obligations pre-obligations. Other obligations should be fulfilled after the action in the access request is performed. We call these kinds of obligations post-obligations. Intuitively, there should be some time interval allocated for each obligation. Otherwise, a policy enforcement engine does not know when it can start evaluating policy conditions in pre-obligations, and subjects in a postobligation can legally avoid obligations by simply saying "I will do it in the future". In some cases, temporal constraints require obligations to be fulfilled repeatedly until some condition becomes true.
• A subject's obligation may result from another subject's action, i.e., the subject of an obligation may be different from the subject who caused the obligation. For instance, when a doctor discloses medical information of a child to third parties (e.g. another doctor), the third parties may be required to fulfill similar obligations to those of the doctor. In some situations, the subject of an obligation may be the system itself, e.g., logging access history.
• Some obligations may be conditional, that is, a conditional obligation is only required to be fulfilled if some related condition becomes true. For instance, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act says that "Before collecting, using or disclosing personal information from a child, an operator must obtain verifiable parental consent from the child's parent." Here, the pre-obligation "obtain verifiable parental consent" needs to be conditional because once the consent has been obtained the pre-obligation should not be executed again.
We will closely follow the notation in [27] . There, the notion of temporal constraints is based on a simple notion of time domain lifted from the set of integers, Z, and the standard order ≤ on Z. For this context, elements of Z are referred to as a time instants. In what follows, given t, t ∈ Z, [t, t ] denotes t − t + 1 consecutive time instants. The following definition from [27] introduces a terse yet flexible definition of temporal constraints that will let us capture a large class of obligations.
Definition 2 A temporal constraint tc is a tuple (t s , t e , cnt), where t s , t e ∈ Z, and cnt ∈ N * . tc denotes a sequence of time intervals defined as follows: For instance, a temporal constraint (3,7,3) represents a sequence of time intervals: [3, 7] , [8, 12] , [13, 17] . For a time interval [t s , t e ], the time instants of the time interval are t s , t s + 1, ..., t e − 1, t e . For example, the time instants in [3, 7] are 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. The notation assumes that time is relative to an action request. We identify two special time instants that are related to a predetermined anchor action: 1) a time instant, referred to as decision time, that is equal to the time instant at which the decision of granting the permission to execute the action is made; 2) a time instant, referred to as completion time, that is the time instant of the completion of the action execution.
2 , if t e ≤ 0, the temporal constraint indicates that the obligation under consideration is a pre-obligation and should be fulfilled during the time interval between the request time and the decision time. If t s ≥ 0, the temporal constraint indicates that the associated obligation is an post-obligation that should be fulfilled sometime after completion time. As a special case, t e = t s = 0 indicates a post-obligation that should be fulfilled right after the action has been executed.
The distinction between the time before granting permission and the time after the execution of the action gives t = 0 a different meaning depending on whether t represents a starting time t s or an ending time t e . In classical access control policies without obligations, the time at which an action request occurs, the time at which to evaluate the condition of applicable permission assignments, the time at which o authorize the action, and the time when the action is performed, are considered to be the same. In practice however these times are different especially when obligations and temporal constraints are introduced.
Definition 3 An obligation is a tuple of the form (Subjects, Action, Resources, Condition, T emporal Constraint)
The subjects, action, resources, purpose, and condition are defined as usual. A temporal constraint is defined according to Definition 2. Although the notion of an obligation is similar to the notion of an access control policy, the semantics is quite different. An access control policy describes that a subject is permitted to perform some action on some resource if some condition is satisfied while an obligation describes that a subject is obliged to perform some action on some resource under some temporal constraints if some condition is satisfied.
Definition 4
An access control policy with obligations is a tuple of the form (Subjects, Action, Resources, P urpose, Condition, Obligations)
The term Obligations denotes a set of obligations in the sense of Definition 3. Obligations associated with an access control policy should not be interpreted as giving blank authorizations to the subjects of the obligations to execute the action imposed by the obligations. Authorization policies should exist; otherwise subjects will not be able to fulfill their obligations. Let's take one of the policies from the introduction: -Privacy: Doctors can collect medical information of a minor for the purpose of treatment after obtaining a written authorization from his/her legal guardian. {writtenAuthorization, guardian(User)}, Condition 1 : writtenAuthorization = na, Constraint 1 : (-7,0,1) } This policy has a single obligation. The obligation has the same subject as the authorization, i.e. the doctor, and it will need to be executed only if the value of the attribute writtenAuthorization is not-available (na), and in must be executed in last 7 unites of time (these could be days) prior to collecting the medical information of a minor.
While it increases the expressiveness of the notion of access control policies, the introduction of obligations in access control policies inevitably causes new problems because of the interaction between obligations and authorizations, and the interaction between obligations.
Analysis of obligations
In the proposed obligation notion, the execution of an obligation can trigger the execution of another obligation. A subject that performs an obligation also needs an authorization to execute the action required by the obligation. The access control policy that provides such authorization may require the execution of some other obligations. The new obligations, in turn, may require the execution of more obligations. We refer to such a phenomenon as cascading of obligations. Let +(s 1 , a 1 , r 1 , p 1 , c 1 , (s 2 , a 2 , r 2 , c 2 , tc 2 )) and +(s 2 , a 2 , r 2 , p 2 , c 2 , (s 1 , a 1 , r 1 , c 1 , tc 1 )) be two positive access control policies each with an obligation. Assume now subject s 1 wants to perform a 1 on resource r 1 , the execution of actions is the following:
1. Based on the first policy, subject s 2 needs to perform a 2 on resource r 2 to let subject s 1 perform a 1 on resource r 1 .
2. Based on the second policy, subject s 1 needs to perform a 1 on resource r 1 to let subject s 2 perform a 2 on resource r 2 .
As we can see, the interaction between obligations and policies causes an infinite action execution. There are other cases that the interaction between obligations and authorizations. Let +(s 1 , a 1 , r 1 , p 1 , c 1 , (s 2 , a 2 , r 2 , c 2 , tc 2 )) be a positive access control policy with an obligation. Other cases that required analysis are:
1. c 1 ∧ c 2 is not satisfiable. In this case, the obligation can never be fulfilled and thus is ineffective.
2. There is no access control policy that authorizes s 2 to perform a 2 on r 2 .
3. The obligation in +(s 1 , a 1 , r 1 , p 1 , c 1 , (s 2 , a 2 , r 2 , c 2 , tc 2 )) is a cascading obligation of itself.
For cases 1 and 2, we can apply the basic policy analysis techniques discussed in previous sections. The basic idea to detect case 3 is to trace the cascading obligations of an access control policy to try to find circular dependencies. Algorithm 1 below returns true if a policy p depends on itself.
Algorithm 1 Condition 3 detection
1: function C3Detection(p, cb) p: the policy to be checked; cb: the list of policies, initial value is p 2:
pl ← policies authorizing the actions in the obligations in p 3:
p ← removehead(pl) We can think of Algorithm 1 as traversing a directed graph in which the nodes are the access control policies and there is an arc from a node to another if an action in the obligations of the first node is the action in the authorization of the second node. The algorithm uses depth-first-search to find cycles.
Dominance analysis in obligations
In XACML, P-RBAC [28] , and E-P3P [3] , given a request, obligations in all applicable access control policies are returned. Therefore, we can expect that some action requests can lead to a large number of obligations, especially if there are ill-written policies. Therefore reducing the number of obligations to be executed may have significant practical impact. Obviously, the reduction should not decrease the duties required by the original policies, but we can imagine that many of these obligations are similar to each other since they are associated with similar permissions. In [27] it is observed that if the appropriate notion of obligation containment is defined, we may safely remove some obligations. For instance, given two post-obligations, one requiring that a privacy notice be sent to both the child and a parent within one week, and another requiring the same privacy notice be sent to the parent within two weeks, if both of them are in the post-obligation set returned upon a user action request, it is reasonable that the user only needs to fulfill the former obligation because the duty represented in the latter is "dominated" by the former. Thus, we will extend the concept of dominance to cover obligations. There are two factors affecting dominance analysis of obligations: the temporal constraints and the obligation conditions. Definition 5 Let tc 1 = (t s1 , t e1 , cnt 1 ) and tc 2 = (t s2 , t e2 , cnt 2 ), t s1 , t e1 , t s2 , t e2 ∈ Z and cnt 1 , cnt 2 ∈ N * , be two temporal constraints. tc 2 covers tc 1 , written as tc 2 £ tc 1 , if and only if one of the following conditions hold:
• t s1 ≥ t s2 ≥ 0 and (t e1 − t s1 ) ≥ (t e2 − t s2 ) and cnt 2 ≥ cnt 1 .
• t e2 ≤ t e1 ≤ 0 and (t e1 − t s1 ) ≤ (t e2 − t s2 ) and cnt 2 ≥ cnt 1 .
For instance, given the post-obligation temporal constraints (0, 5, 2) and (0, 4, 3), it is obvious that (0, 4, 3) covers (0, 5, 2) because (0, 4, 3) requires that the fulfillment of a corresponding obligation be started right after an action is performed, and completed in 5 days. Moreover this obligation fulfillment cycle should be repeated 3 times. On the other hand, (0, 5, 2) requires that the fulfillment of a corresponding obligation be completed in 6 days and only to be repeated 2 times. Post-obligations are duties; therefore the smaller the repeating number is, the less strict the temporal constraint is. A stricter post-obligation dominates a less strict post-obligation.
Given the pre-obligation temporal constraints (-5,0,2) and (-3,0,1), (-5,0,2) covers (-3,0,1) because only one chance, one 4-day time period, is given to fulfill a pre-obligation by (-3,0,1) and two chances, two 6-day time periods, are given to fulfill a pre-obligation by (-5,0,2). In order to understand the dominance of a temporal constraint in a pre-obligation, we have to first realize the difference between pre-obligations and post-obligations. Unlike post-obligations, pre-obligations are actions that must be fulfilled before the requested action can be allowed and the result of the fulfillment can determine whether the requested action is executable or not 3 . The smaller the count number in a pre-obligation temporal constraint is, the stricter the temporal constraint is. A less strict pre-obligation dominates a stricter pre-obligation. In other words, the bigger the count number in a pre-obligation temporal constraint is, the more chances are that the condition of the access control policy be satisfied. ob 1 = (c 1 , s 1 , a 1 , r 1 , tc 1 ) and ob 2 = (c 2 , s 2 , a 2 , r 2 , tc 2 ) be obligations. ob 2 dominates ob 1 iff c 1 implies c 2 , s 1 = s 2 , a 1 = a 2 , r 1 = r 2 , and tc 2 £ tc 1 .
Definition 6 Let
An example of dominance relation between two obligations is the following: ob 1 = (*, lab service, send, privacy notice(patient), (0,182,∞)) ob 2 = (*, lab service, send, privacy notice(patient), (0,365,∞))
In this example the laboratory in a hospital is required to send privacy notices to their customers periodically. Assume that time is measured in days in the temporal constraints. Since obligation ob 1 requires to be fulfilled every half a year and obligation ob 2 only requires once a year, ob 1 dominates ob 2 .
Based on the definition, the coverage analysis of obligations is straightforward.
Policy similarity
In this section we look at analysis from a different perspective. We are looking now at policies coming from different authors and perhaps different organizations and we would like to discover similarities. The sharing of resources such as services, data and knowledge in collaborative applications often gives rise to scenarios in which the access control policies of collaborating parties must be compared. For example, a party P may decide to release some data to a party P only if the access control policies of P are very much the same as its own access control policies. Similar requirement arises in a scenario where several alternative resources and services, each governed by its own independently-administered access control policies, may have to be selected and combined in a complex service. In order to maximize the number of requests that can be satisfied by the complex service, and also satisfy the access control policies of each participating resource and service, one would like to select a combination of resources and services characterized by access control policies that are very much similar. Policy similarity can be defined as the characterization of the relationships among the sets of requests respectively authorized by a set of policies. The goal of policy similarity analysis is to provide such a characterization. The result of a policy similarity analysis between a set of policies can be used to derive for all requests of the form (s, a, r, p) the corresponding effects of the policies in the set and thus to compare the behavior of policies in the set with respect to all possible requests. Such an analysis can be used to answer the common property and discrimination queries which could be helpful during the harmonization of security and privacy policies. It can also be used for change impact analysis where an administrator may want to verify the effect of changes to current policies [12] or find differences among rules.
We will discuss two types of approaches [24, 22] to determine similarity between policies. One approach uses the notion of a policy similarity measure between policies and is a quick but less precise technique based on principles from the information retrieval field [24] . Another approach is precise but computationally intensive and uses Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDD) based techniques [22] .
Broad policy similarities
In this approach, a similarity score, a value in the interval [0, 1], is computed between two policies to quantify the degree of similarity between them. Higher(lower) values of similarity between two policies indicate that there are more(less) number of requests for which the policies have the same effect. The similarity computation is simple and quick and is based on techniques from the information retrieval field.
The similarity measure takes into account the various elements of the policies. Given two policies, the algorithm for computing similarity score first groups the same type of elements in the two input policies, and evaluates their similarity. Then the scores obtained for the different elements of the policies are combined according to a weighted (usually linear) combination in order to produce an overall similarity score. Weights are used so that one can emphasize scores obtained due to one or more specific elements when computing the similarity. For example, one may want to find policies most similar with respect to the subjects to which they apply to. Techniques like dictionary lookup and ontology matching can also be incorporated when computing the similarity scores to bridge the semantic gap arising due to the use of different vocabularies in expressing access control policies. Such techniques are particularly useful when harmonizing policies across administrative domains where each domain may use a different vocabulary for names and values appearing in their policies.
Policy similarity measure can be used to compare many classes of policies. Here we briefly show similarity measures can be defined for two very different languages: XACML [26] and P3P [9] .
• An XACML rule collects the (subject, resource, action) into a single element called a target in addition to having the condition and an effect (i.e. positive or negative authorization). An XACML policy consists of a set of these rules with a "global" target. A policy rule applies if both the global target and the target of the rule matched (i.e. the intersection is not empty). Each of these policy elements is abstracted into a list of attribute (name, value) pairs. A score between two elements is computed by comparing the list of such pairs and accumulating their scores. A score between two pairs is computed by comparing the corresponding name and value components. Different computations are used for comparing values belonging to numerical and categorical attribute types. In particular, for comparing categorical values associated with domain specific ontologies a score that reflects the distance in the hierarchy between two concepts is used. For comparing numerical values a score that reflects closeness in the values being compared is used.
• A P3P policy is mainly composed of statements that describe the data and category of information collected along with how the information may be used, how the information may be shared and the associated data retention policies. Thus a P3P policy can be abstracted into a list of tuples each containing the data, category, purpose, recipient and retention elements. Each of the elements can contain values belonging to a pre-defined set specified in the P3P specification. A similarity score between two P3P policies is derived by computing the similarity score between pairs of tuples corresponding to the two policies. A score between a pair of tuples is calculated by comparing the individual components of the two tuples.
Although this approach cannot be used to specifically enumerate the precise differences among policies with respect to specific requests it can be used as a quick filter approach to prune dissimilar policies before using more precise similarity analyzers which are computationally intensive. This is particularly helpful when a large number of policies need to be compared. Such similarity measure between policies can also serve as distance functions when performing data mining techniques like clustering on policy sets.
Narrow policy similarities
The narrow similarity analysis uses a MTBDD [13] representation of a policy. A policy MTBDD is a directed acyclic graph whose internal nodes represent Boolean predicates corresponding to the S, A, R, C, P components of a policy and whose terminals can be one of {permit, deny, not applicable} representing the effect of the policy on requests that satisfy the Boolean predicates along the path from root to the terminals. In effect, the paths represent the rules of a policy. Policy MTBDDs of the individual policies being compared for similarity are combined to derive a single MTBDD in which each terminal corresponds to a n-tuple < e 1 , e 2 , ...., e n > where e i is the effect of policy P i on all requests that satisfy the Boolean predicates along the path from root to the terminal. By traversing paths leading to specified terminals in the combined MTBDD, one can derive the set of requests which have common or different authorizations in the given set of policies. For example, one can derive all requests permitted by both policies by traversing all paths leading to the terminal < permit, permit > in the combined MTBDD. An XACML policy can be transformed to an equivalent Boolean expression which can then be used for MTBDD construction and analysis.
For example, consider a scenario when a patient would like to transfer his medical records from hospital X to hospital Y each of which has its own policy, P 1 and P 2 respectively, governing access to a patient's medical record. Policy P 1 allows access to medical records if the patient has consented and if the subject who needs access is either a nurse or a primary physician. Policy P 2 allows access to medical records if the patient has consented or a surgery has been scheduled and if the subject is either a surgeon or a nurse. The two policies P 1 and P 2 can be stated more succinctly as follows:
Before transferring the medical records, the patient would like to ensure that hospital Y's security policy offers similar level of security as that of hospital X. A similarity analysis between P 1 and P 2 can be used to ensure such requirement. Figure 1 shows the MTBDDs corresponding to P 1, P 2 and their combination. Paths leading to the P−P terminal in the combined MTBDD highlight the similarity between the two policies while the remaining paths show the differences. The patient can use this information before deciding to transfer his medical records.
Two systems use MTBDDs to do similarity analysis. Margrave [12] has been developed for the analysis of role-based access-control policies written in XACML. EXAM [22] incorporates in a single system similarity comparisons based on similarity scores and similarity analysis based on MTBDDs both for XACML policies. Note that this method can be used to answer many of the queries introduced in Section 3.
Margrave implementation handles Boolean expression formulas built using Category 1 type expressions. The EXAM system [22] handles the four classes. 
Policy decomposition and distribution
In many situations organizations have several collaborating parties each responsible for managing and protecting resources entrusted to them. Access control decisions thus become a collaborative activity where there is a need to enforce a global policy among collaborating parties without compromising the autonomy or confidentiality requirements of the involved parties. Some of the information may be sensitive and there may not be a unique party having all the necessary information to take an access control decision.
Take a hypothetical example of a hospital with multiple departments including a financial department and a laboratory service department. Each department is responsible for managing access to its resources and each department stores confidential data concerning its specific operations. Consider a (simplified) global policy (Manager, buy, MedicalSupplyY, , Balance >10M ∧ MedicalExamX ="scheduled") which specifies that a manager of the laboratory service can buy a very expensive medical supply Y that is needed for a medical exam X if there are enough funds in the department budget and the medical exam X has been scheduled for a patient. Suppose that information about exams and patient records is managed by the laboratory service department and the information about the funds is managed by the financial department, and that each department is not able, for confidentiality reasons, to release its own information to others. Here, the access to medical records is protected for privacy considerations to the patients while access to financial information is protected according to security policies of the health organization. Further assume that global policy requires for any requests to be approved by the head of each department and the approval be recorded, through the execution of obligation actions. In such scenario a centralized enforcement of the policy is not feasible. Rather a more suitable approach would consist of "distributing" the policy to the two departments asking each of them to return its own "local" decision. The local decisions are then combined to generate the global decision.
The aim is then to analyze and decompose the policy into sub-policies that can be sent to the different parties to enforce. The basic idea is to analyze the global policy and identify the portions in the global policy that need the information available at each local party. Local policies are constructed and kept in each site. When an access decision is needed the relevant parts of the request are sent to the different parties involved, independent decisions are returned and combined to derive the access control decision as a whole. [23] describes an architecture and process to decompose policies. We will describe both in the following sections.
Architecture
To support collaborative access control, the system architecture of [23] consists of a central policy enforcement point (PEP) and multiple policy decision points (PDP) (e.g. Figure 2 ). This differs from the typical access control policy framework where a single PEP and a single PDP are considered. In such a system, a global policy is decomposed into local policies for each PDP according to the availability/sensitivity requirements of each party and user specified constraints, and then local policies are sent to the corresponding PDPs. Once the global policy has been decomposed, it will be encrypted and stored in a secure store. That means that the global policy will no longer be used for the subsequent request evaluation. Instead, only the non sensitive information of each global policy is kept as plain text in a policy table maintained by the central PEP. In the previous example, if the action "Buy" and the resource "MedicalSupplyY" are non sensitive information, they will be kept as plain text. The evaluation tasks of other sensitive information are distributed to local PDPs. For example, the threshold amount to permit the operation without any other requirement might be confidential and kept by the financial department. When a request is issued, the central PEP first checks whether the request matches the public information stored at the PEP. If there is a match, the central PEP will check the policy table and distribute the request to the corresponding local PDPs. A local policy may contain predicates on both sensitive and non sensitive attributes. For non sensitive attributes, the local PDP looks for the attribute values in the request. For sensitive attributes, the local PDP accesses its local database and resolves the attribute values regardless of whether the request includes such values or not. In some situations, additional information like the requester ID may be needed to help local PDPs resolve the values of the sensitive attributes. The responses of local PDPs are collected and returned to the coordinator where the final decision is made.
The approach assumes that each participating party is trusted and local PDPs will correctly enforce the portions of the global policy that have been sent to them. In the case parties other than the central PEP are compromised by an attacker the information stored at these parties might be leaked while the information stored at other parties is still safe. Similarly, only the request evaluation involving the hacked parties may not be carried out properly. If the central PEP has been attacked, it is hard for the attacker to know the original global policies as they are encrypted. To summarize, the system architecture is designed to prevent the attackers from knowing predicates on sensitive attributes in local policies as well as sensitive information stored at local PDPs.
Policy analysis and decomposition algorithm
The analysis and decomposition consists of four main steps. First, each rule in the global policy must be translated into a compound boolean expression over policy attributes. A compound boolean expression is composed of atomic boolean expressions combined using the logical operations ∨ and ∧. This expression combines all five components of a policy. The second step is to decide what portion of the policy needs to be assigned to which PDP. Each atomic boolean expression is labeled with the ID of the local PDP that contains the attribute information in the atomic boolean expression, and then atomic boolean expressions are grouped based on their labels. The third step is to generate an actual local policy according to each group of correlated atomic boolean expressions. The last step is to compute the effects of original rule from the corresponding local policies.
According to the algorithm, the example policy will be decomposed into two policies P 1 and P 2 as follows.
Final remarks
There is a large amount of work related to policy analysis. Our goal with this paper has been to show a large spectrum of techniques so that the reader can grasp the many different angles from which the problem of analysis can be attacked. Many of these techniques were originally presented either for access control in a security setting or for privacy. We have not made such a distinction to demonstrate that in practice security and privacy are intermingled and the same approaches can be applied to both types of policies.
There is a general class of analysis problems for which we do not have examples in this paper but it deserves special attention. These are analyses of policies that depend on dynamic changes in the system where the policies are enforced. We have touched slightly on one example of this type of analysis when we introduced the concept of cascading obligations. Algorithm 1 overestimates the dependencies. It might be the case that a dependency path from an obligation o 1 to a cascading obligation o 2 can never be traversed because the execution of an action in the path may invalidate the condition of another obligation later in the path. Hence, although o 1 can be equal to o 2 the system never runs into this circular dependency. There is a complementary problem with obligations and this is that access required for o 2 may depend on the fulfillment of all the obligations between o 1 and o 2 . For example, a hospital may have a policy that states that any case that might lead to an open heart surgery must be reviewed by one of the senior cardiologists. Another policy may say that a physician that is not treating a patient needs to get the patient's consent in order to get access to his or her medical records. The first obligation cannot be fulfilled without the second obligation. These dependencies can be complicated to detect. Irwin et al. [15] defined a secure state as the state where any obligation violation can only be due to the lack of diligence of subjects. A good property for a system to have is to allow a set of policies and execution environments that only move through secure states. Irwin et al. show that this is a computationally hard problem. Some ways of addressing the problem are also discussed in [15] . More about the analysis of obligations can be found in [11] and the references therein.
In the same class we have problems related to dynamic separation of duty and Chinese walls. These are temporal properties that forbid subject access to resources depending on the behavioral history of the subject. A trivial example is that a doctor cannot give a second opinion on a case in which she was involved earlier. These constraints can expand over long transactions and workflows. Analyses of this problem are also computationally hard in general. Some approaches for dealing with these problems can be found in [21] and [30] .
In general analysis will be limited if we are not able to incorporate at least partially the behavior of computer systems into the analysis. Consider, for example, a policy which states that the primary health-care provider of a patient is permitted to access the patients medical record, but that nurses in the first year of training are denied such access. These two policy rules are in potential conflict, assuming that subjects are organized in a hierarchical structure and nurses in training are also considered to be primary health-care providers according to the subject hierarchy. In this situation a nurse would both be permitted and denied access to his or her patients records. However, the medical records system may be engineered in such a way as to prevent, not as a consequence of policy rules but as a result of the behavior of the system, nurses in training from becoming primary care providers, and thus the conflict will not arise. It is only by analyzing policies in conjunction with the laws of system evolution that a correct analysis is obtained. Incorporating system dynamics into the analysis of policies is explored in [30] and [4] . supported the collaboration between teams at IBM Research, CMU and Purdue.
